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ABSTRACT: It is shown that standard versions of overt and tacit
collusion under quantity-setting oligopoly are formally 
equivalent. The two approaches are combined to model collusive 























































































































































































Three distinct themes appeared in the earliest scholarly
reactions to Cournot's 11838] analysis of duopoly. Perhaps the most
prominent was that error lay in specifying quantity rather than price
as the decision variable CBertrand [1883, p. 5031: Fisher [1898, p.
1261: Edgeworth [1922]]. The current consensus is that it is useful
to model both price-setting and quantity-setting markets.
The two remaining themes, also introduced by Bertrand [1883, p.
503], are stated concisely by Fisher [1898, p. 126]:
The fault to be found in [Cournot's] reasoning is in his 
premise that each individual will act on the assumption 
that his rival’s output Is constant, and will strive only 
to so regulate his own output as to secure the largest 
profit.
The first criticism is that Cournot analyzed a duopoly in which 
each duopolist acted in the belief that the other's control variable 
was fixed. The second criticism is that Cournot had each duopolist 
maximize its own profit, and only its own profit.
Although economists had been tardy in recognizing the importance 
of Cournot's work, they were not slow explore alternative 
specifications, in attempts to relax one or the other of these 
assumptions. Edgeworth [1881, p. 53] introduced what has come to be 
the "coefficient of cooperation" approach, and formally explored the 
implications of partial joint profit maximization.1 Bowley [1924, p. 38]
1. Edgeworth used the kinder, gentler term "coefficient of effective 
sympathy." "Coefficient of cooperation," due to Cyert and DeGroot 




























































































wrote out first-order conditions for conjectural derivatives In 
duopoly, specifying a model in which expectations of rivals' reactions 
are not set to zero by assumption.2
Three different ways of modeling conjectural variations have 
appeared in the literature, and two of these have been widely used. 
Although equivalent in equilibrium, the alternative approaches to 
modeling conjectures have different implications for firms' behavior 
out of equilibrium, and for the specification of tests of market 
power. The relationship among the three specifications is discussed 
below.
Only recently have economists begun to compare and contrast the 
conjectural variation and coefficient of cooperation approaches to 
modeling oligopolistic interactions (Mueller [1987, pp. 56-61]).3 
In what follows, I show that the coefficient of cooperation approach 
is formally equivalent to one of the common conjectural variation 
specifications. I also show that the two approaches can be combined, 
to obtain a model of cooperation with conjectures as to rivals' 
behavior.
2. Bowley's discussion, "auBerordentlich kurze," received prompt 
recognition: see Schneider [1932, pp. 167-1691.
3. It is interesting to note that a textbook treatment of conjectural 
variations (Cohen and Cyert [1965, pp. 230-2411) included a discussion 




























































































II. Conjectural Variations Models
A. Alternative Specifications of Conjectures
Consider an oligopoly of n firms which supply a standardized 
product to a market with inverse demand curve
(1) p - a - b Q - a -  bCqj ♦ q2 * ... * qR) .
Let c, be the constant marginal and average cost of firm i,'* 
and for notational convenience, define
(2) CL, • Q -  q,
as the output of all firms except firm i. Three specifications 
of firm conjectures have appeared in the literature.
Frisch [1933, p. 252] discusses conjectural elasticities, which 
in the current accepted notation can be defined as
„  91°g  Q-i A .  A l
tdJ ’  31og q( Q_, dq( '
a, is the percentage change in rivals' output which firm i 
expects in response to a unit percentage change in its own output. 
Recent use of the conjectural elasticity approach can be traced to 
Dickson [1982] and Clarke and Davies [1982].4 5
In contrast, Hicks [1935] defines conjectural derivatives, of the
form
4. For ease of exposition, I suppose fixed costs are zero. Positive 
fixed costs would introduce discontinuities in reaction curves and the 
potential for non-existence of equilibrium.
5. Kwoka and Ravenscraft [1985] refer to (3] as the Clarke-Davles 
model. Bresnahan [1983] has noted the difficulty of establishing 
priority of authorship in this ancient and cyclic literature. The 




























































































X, is the absolute change in rivals' output expected by firm i in 
response to a unit absolute change in its own output. This 
formulation of conjectural beliefs is probably dominant in theoretical 
discussions. Despite some earlier appearances,6 the “growth 
industry" phase of the literature using conjectural derivatives can be 
traced to Cowling [1976] and Bresnahan [1981].
Gallop and Roberts [1979] introduce a relative specification of 
conjectural beliefs:
P( is the percentage change in rivals' output which firm i 
expects in response to a unit absolute change in its own output. Use 
of the relative conjecture specification in standard oligopoly models 
frequently yields results which are of limited tractability. In one 
respect, however, the relative conjecture approach has implications 
which are more palatable than those of either the conjectural 
derivative or the conjectural elasticity approach.
6. Fellner [1949, footnote 1, pp. 55-56] gives references to much of 
the early literature. His own discussion [1949, pp. 71-77] is in 































































































B. Reaction Curves in Conjectural Oligopoly
If firm i selects output to maximize its own profit.
*1 - (P - Ci)qt ,
the resulting first-order condition is
(7) ( ]q( - Q_, - S
where
(8]
is a natural measure of the size of the market from the point of view 
of firm i: the quantity which would be demanded if price were equal
to firm i's marginal cost.
Substituting (3), (4), and (5), respectively, into (7) yields 
alternative expressions for firm i's reaction curve:
Note that in each case the parameters which describe firm cost 
and market demand affect reaction curves (and therefore equilibrium) 
only insofar as they affect the market size index S|.
There are obvious algebraic relationships among a (, ( 3 and X,:




It follows that if (for example) we take a, to be a constant
and require that Pj and X, be everywhere equivalent to a,, then P] and 




























































































Figure 1: Conjectural Derivative/Conjectural Elasticity
Reaction Curves, Firm 1
Notesi drawn for duopoly, p - 10 - Q, c, - 1, • j
Oj, Pj and Xj be equivalent in equilibrium, we need only substitute 
the equilibrium values of q( and q_( in (12).
Imposing equivalence in equilibrium, one obtains three distinct 
reaction curves, as shown in Figure 1.
With conjectural derivatives, equation (9) indicates that rivals 
must supply S,, the quantity demanded at a price equal to firm i's marginal 
cost, to drive firm i from the market. This accords with economic 
intuition: for rival output less than St, firm i can always make some




























































































In contrast, and counterintuitively, with conjectural elasticities 
equation (10] shows that rivals can drive firm i from the market while
S,
producing somewhat less than S,. Although price at output -j—^  g is
above firm i's marginal cost, with a constant conjectural elasticity 
firm 1 believes that if it were to operate as a monopolist on the 
residual demand curve, rivals would expand output sufficiently to push 
price below marginal cost.
If rivals drop out of the market, firm i is a monopolist. With 
conjectural elasticities, firm I’s reaction curve gives the intuitive 
result: for Q_( * 0, firm i produces the monopoly output. But with
conjectural derivatives, if rivals drop out of the market, firm i 
chooses to produce something less than the monopoly output. Although 
rivals produce nothing, firm i believes that if it expanded output to 
the monopoly level, rivals would expand output sufficiently to result 
in a net loss of profit to firm i.
Thus the conjectural derivative reaction curve gives the 
intuitive result when firm i drops out of the market, and the 
conjectural elasticity reaction curve gives the intuitive result when 
rivals drop out of the market. As shown in Figure 1, the relative 
conjecture reaction curve, equation (11), (which is a rotated 
hyperbola) gives the intuitive result at both extremes. With relative 
conjectures, a firm will produce the monopoly output if rivals drop 




























































































a price equal to a firm's marginal cost before the firm will withdraw 
from the market. In this sense, relative conjectures yield a 
description of oligopoly behavior which is more appealing than that 
provided by either the conjectural derivative or the conjectural 
elasticity approach.
Table 1: Test of Conjectural Derivative vs. Conjectural 
Elasticity Specifications
Company Intercept Share Capital-Sales
Ratio
R2
Anderson, Clayton 0.0328 0.3946 -0.0252 0.0999








C. A Test of Specification Cl)7
The conjectural derivative and conjectural elasticity 
specifications have been widely used in theoretical and empirical work 
in industrial economics. It is possible to test which specification 
better describes data for an individual firm.
The conjectural derivative specification Implies that firm i's 
Lemer index of market power is8 
P ~ c.(13)
* x,) •
7. For comparison with (13) and (14), note that the Lemer index for 
the relative conjecture specification is
♦ PtQ-
Qp 1




























































































In this model, an increase in the conjectural derivative has 
the same effect as a decrease in the price elasticity of demand: to 
increase the Lemer index.
The Lemer index for the conjectural elasticity specification is 
(Clarke and Davies [1982])
where s, is firm i's market share.
It is useful to think of the numerator on the right in (14) as a 
weighted average of 1 (the monopoly market share) and Sj, the firm's 
market share. An increase in the conjectural elasticity a, increases the 
weight given to 1, reduces the weight given to S[, and increases the 
Lemer index.
An empirical specification which includes (13) and (14) as 
special cases is9
where VCt is variable costs and the final term on the right, the 
capital-sales ratio, controls for the normal rate of return on 
capital.
(14)
p - c 
P
a, * (1 - a,)s, 
6 Op
( 15)
9. Martin [1984]. I assume here constant returns to scale. For an 
extension to the case of non-constant returns to scale in a related 




























































































Comparing (13) and (15), the conjectural derivative model implies 
that the intercept term on the right in (15), a0, is zero. An 
intercept term in (15) which is significantly different from zero is 
consistent with the conjectural elasticity model but not the 
conjectural derivative model.
Table 1 reports estimates of equation (15) for two firms in the 
U.S. food processing industry.10 The estimate of the intercept 
term for Anderson, Clayton & Co. is insignificantly different from 
zero, which (in the context of the models discussed in this section) 
suggests that the conjectural derivative specification is appropriate 
for Anderson, Clayton & Co.
In contrast, the intercept term in the estimate of (15) for the 
Beatrice Company is significantly different from zero. This is 
consistent with the implications of the conjectural elasticity 
specification.
10. Sales and margin data, taken from Compustat data tapes, are 
quarterly, from 1973.2 through 1982.4 for Anderson, Clayton and 
Company and from 1973.1 through 1982.4 for Beatrice. Estimates of the 




























































































III. The Coefficient of Cooperation Model
A. Formal Equivalence to the Conjectural Elasticity Model
Suppose now that firm i maximizes a weighted average of its own 
profit and joint profit:
( 1 6 ) g, = n, ♦ = ci - e,)n, + e ^ i i j .
6, is firm i's coefficient of cooperation, which indexes the weight 
firm i gives to other firms' profit when it takes its own decisions.
Such an objective function might be thought of as describing collusive 
behavior. Alternatively, it could be thought of as describing the 
behavior of a firm which owns a fraction 6, of its rivals, so sharing 
in their profits (Bresnahan and Salop [1986], Reynolds and Snapp 
[1986]).
It is straightforward to show that, on the Cournot conjectural 
assumption, the first-order condition for (16) implies a reaction 
curve
(17) q, - ^[S, - (1 * e,)Q_,]
and a Lerner index 
(18)
p - ct 6, » (1 - 8j)s, 
6nP <=Qp
Comparing (17) and (18) with (10) and (14), respectively, it is 
apparent that the conjectural derivative model and the coefficient of 
cooperation model are formally equivalent.
It follows that the empirical literature motivated by models of
conjectural elasticities may be reinterpreted as providing tests of 
the coefficient of cooperation model. Without additional theoretical 




























































































The formal identity of the conjectural elasticity and the 
conjectural elasticity approach has certain implications for the 
consistent conjectures literature, although that literature has 
developed in the context of the conjectural derivative model.
In the context of the conjectural elasticities model, the consistent 
conjectures literature would suggest exploring the implications of the 
requirement that the conjectural elasticity of rivals’ output equal 
the actual elasticity of rivals’ output. In a study of conjectural 
interactions, this is a natural line of investigation. Problems with 
the existence of consistent conjectures have led some to suggest that 
game theoretic techniques, and those alone, are the appropriate 
techniques for the analysis of oligopolistic interactions (Makowski 
[1987]s see also Bhaskar [1989]).
The formal equivalence of the coefficient of cooperation approach 
and the conjectural elasticity approach suggests that the obituary of 
Cournot, conjectural, coefficient of cooperation, reaction function 
approach is premature. In a coefficient of cooperation model, there 
is no equivalent of the "rational conjecture." Firms make their own 
decisions without knowing or having beliefs about the coefficients of 
cooperation of their rivals. The existence or nonexistence of 
consistent beliefs about rivals’ coefficients of cooperation is 
irrelevant to the insights yielded by the coefficient of cooperation 
model. Yet the coefficient of cooperation model is formally 
equivalent to one of the two widely-used conjectures models. If - as 
seems likely - the coefficient of cooperation approach has a place in 





























































































B. Cooperation With Conjectures
The Cournot behavioral assumption is no more appealing in a 
coefficient of cooperation model than elsewhere in the analysis of 
oligopoly. If the Cournot behavioral assumption is abandoned in the 
coefficient of cooperation model, the result is a model of partial 
cooperation with conjectures concerning rivals’ behavior.
1. Reaction curves
Conjectural derivatives
Suppose all firms have the same marginal and average cost fc, »  c 
for all i). It is then possible to derive equations for the reaction 
curves of one firm and of all other firms, on the assumption that all 
other firms produce the same output. This assumption is met in 
equilibrium. Its convenience is that it allows us to condense the 
equations of n reaction curves to two, and permits graphical depiction 
of the reaction curves.
If we further assume that all firms have the same coefficients of 
cooperation and conjectural variations, equilibrium will be symmetric, 
in the sense that all firms produce the same output in equilibrium.
These assumptions simplify the algebra without altering the 
qualitative nature of the results.
If conjectural derivatives are grafted onto the coefficient of 




























































































S - [1 - 6(1 -  X)J(n - l)q  ,
<1, 1 ----------------2~ r \ ----------------
S - [1 - 6(1 - X )^
‘  n ♦ X + (n - 2)6(1 - X)
respectively, where q t is output per firm of all firms other 
than firm 1.
The reaction curves have the advantage of being linear. It is 
straightforward to solve for equilibrium values. Equilibrium, as 
shown in Figure 2, is symmetric and stable.


































































































If conjectural elasticities are combined with the coefficient of 
cooperation model, the reaction curves of firm 1 and all other firms 
are
(20a) 2q2 ♦ (n - 1X1 + a )(l + 0)q(q_( + 2(o * l ) 2a0q2, - Sq( - (n - l)aBSq - 0
and
2ot0q2 * [(1 + oOCl * 0) ♦ 4(n - 2)a0)qlq_l 
(20b) + (2  - (n - 2)((1 a )(l + 0) - 2(n - 2)a0])q2[
-  a0Sq( -  (1 ♦ (n - 2)a0]Sq_] -  0 .
respectively.
In symmetric equilibrium (letting q] - q = q), price and output 
per firm are
(21) p . c ♦ & - 1)[(X - aJIL . - 9) - (n - 2)(1 - a0))bs
2 ♦ (n - 1)(1 - a )(l - 8) - 2(n - l ) 2a0 
and
(22) q = ------------------- 1 - (n - l)a8--------------- — bs
2 * (n - 1)(1 + a )(l * 0) 2(n - I )2a0
respectively.
The reaction curves (20) are rotated hyperbolae.12 The 
number of terms in (20b) which vanish if n - 2 suggests that duopoly
11. Reaction curves for the conjectural elasticity-coefficient of 
cooperation case have been analyzed using BASIC programs vetted by 
comparison with Borland's Eureka. These programs are available on 
request.





























































































13 a special case, and this proves to be correct. Taking 0 > 0, 
duopoly reaction curves typically exhibit a single equilibrium, which 
is symmetric and stable.
Moving beyond duopoly, it is useful to distinguish 2 cases. 0 > 0 
and a < 0 may be thought of as collusion with distrust. In this case 
firms partially maximize joint profit, but each firm lacks confidence in 
the behavior of its fellows. Each firm expects that as it restricts 
output, rivals will expand output. Unless a is highly negative, there 
is typically a single equilibrium in which all firms have positive 
output. This is the symmetric equilibrium, and it is stable.
Distrust may be bad for the soul, but it Is apparently good for 
oligopolistic equilibrium.
Things are otherwise if 0 > 0 and a > 0. A symmetric equilibrium 
in which all firms have positive output typically exists.
Nonsymmetric equilibria in which all firms have positive output may 
also exist. The symmetric equilibrium may be stable or unstable. In 
some cases, there are stable equilibria in which one firm has 
radically larger output than other firms.13 Trust may be good 
for the soul, but it is not necessarily good for market position.
13. If n ■ 4, a » .4, 0 ■ .6, and S ■ 90, there is a unstable 
equilibrium in which each firm produces 11.87 units of output. There 
is a stable equilibrium in which one firm produces 29.57 units of 




























































































2. The Lerner Index
The Lerner index for the coefficient of cooperation-conjectural 
derivative model is
(23]




The right-hand side of equation (23), like that of (18), has a 
constant term and is linear in market share. (23), like (14) or (18), 
could be used to motivate the estimating equation (15).
The Lerner index for the coefficient of cooperation-conjectural 
elasticity model is
(24)
p - ct 6, * (1 - e,)s, a ( «
~ T ~ ~  ~ eQp
[a, * 6, -  2a|91) (1 -  a ,)(l




l ° l_ X  
eQp sl
3. A Test of Specification (II)




PI, = bn * b.s, . ( «
„ p \
pt pq,
Within the context of the coefficient of cooperation model, it is 
possible to distinguish between the conjectural derivative and the 
conjectural elasticity specifications by examining the significance of 





























































































If this coefficient is significantly different from zero, as for 
Anderson, Clayton & Co. in Table 2, the results are consistent with 
the coefficient of cooperation, conjectural elasticity model.
Comparing Tables 1 and 2, it is evident that use of the inverse market 
share term substantially increases the statistical significance of 
coefficient estimates and the explanatory power of the regression for 
Anderson, Clayton & Co.
Table 2: Test of Conjectural Derivative vs. Conjectural 
Elasticity Specifications
Company Intercept Share 1/Share C ap ita l-Sa les
Ratio
R2
Anderson, -0.6104 4.3162 0.0258 -0.0379 0.2422










No such effect is apparent for Beatrice. An insignificant 
coefficient of the inverse market share term suggests rejection of the 
coefficient of cooperation-conjectural elasticity approach in favor of 
the coefficient of cooperation-conjectural derivative model.
IV. Final Remarks
In terms of their implications for firm behavior, market 
equilibrium, and market performance, the coefficient of cooperation 
and model and the conjectural elasticity models are equivalent.
It is possible to test which conjectural specification provides 
the better explanation of firm performance. This is so whether or not 
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